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Emergent Transportation “Platforms”
in Latin America: Online Communities
and Their Governance Models
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Independent Researcher, Sydney, NSW, Australia
New models of peer governance are emerging from online communities in the Global
South. This is visible in an understudied case of ridesharing “platforms” created on social
media communities and materializing in Latin American cities. In this article, I investigate
these online communities in different cities of Colombia and how they develop peer
governance models. A particular focus is paid to developing organization forms that do not
follow the typical structure of firms. In these communities, I study the relationships between
members, community managers, and the governance rules they create, while illuminating
the hierarchies present, the accountability of their administrators, and its legitimacy. The
emerging literature on platform cooperativism, platform urbanism, and peer governance is
used to structure a way to understand this new phenomenon with its “southern”
particularities. Moreover, in-person and online qualitative research methods are
incorporated to engage with the elusive nature of these structures. This will be one of
the first studies engaging with the peer governance dilemmas emerging from online
communities in the Global South. An analysis on what the platform literature and the
institutional ecosystem in developing countries can harness from the particularities of these
community-platforms as they evolve in these contexts is also included.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the arrival of Uber in Colombia in 2013, and the further expansion of other platforms from
2015 to 2016 (El Espectador, 2019), there have been user complaints about security and dynamic
rates, together with driver’s issues with low earnings and high commissions. Also, driving with any
type of platform in Colombia can risk the suspension of driving licenses and remarkably high fines.
Ridesharing provided by platforms is, as of 2020, still deemed illegal by the Colombian transportation
authorities.
Uber and other similar platforms in Colombia are, however, in a legal gray area: The platforms by
themselves (not their services) are considered legal as they enter the umbrella of “net neutrality”
established by the Colombian government (Congress of the Republic of Colombia, 2011) and its
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (Communications Regulation
Commission of Colombia, 2011). However, they are considered to provide an illegal
transportation service as per the regulation of the Ministry of Transportation. There have been
many regulatory attempts to formalize ridesharing platforms (Congress of the Republic of Colombia,
House of Representatives, 2019), nevertheless, the pressure by interest groups, such as taxi drivers,
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has impeded any relaxation of the transportation regulations or
modifications to adapt to new technologies.
Within this context, in recent years there has been an
emergence of online communities that use apps such as
WhatsApp, Facebook, and Zello as communication
mechanisms but still operate outside the multinational
platforms. Zello in particular is an application that allows
transforming any smartphone or tablet into a walkie-talkie,
using the free PTT (Push-to-talk) radio app. It allows for
contacting other users privately but, more importantly, it also
allows users to join public channels. Among the features of the
app, there is real-time streaming, contacts’ availability and status,
public and private channels for up to 6,000 users, push
notifications, image sharing, and the capacity to work over
different types and qualities of internet connections.
It is here where a considerable entrepreneurial and social
process is emerging among people in Colombia: Drivers are
using online communities on Facebook, WhatsApp, or Zello
to create their own “platforms” and compensate for low
earnings in the multinational companies. In many cases these
drivers even abandon the multinational platforms such as Uber to
work fully in their own structures.
Together with WhatsApp and Zello, drivers are also using fare
meters via apps such as “Blumeter,” which allows them to
coordinate and establish their own transportation schedules,
prices, and even geographical divisions to avoid direct
competition between them. This level of organization speaks
about governance structures and hierarchies, where leadership
is performed by specific individuals.
On these emergent online communities-platforms there is also
evidence of internal governance rules. These rules include aspects
such as internal codes, access-exclusion mechanisms, and fees to
be paid to access the mediation benefits of the online community
“platform”. Members of these communities are consolidating
their role and earnings through referrals and previous ratings
in more established multinational platforms, as these
communities function on parameters of trust, voice-to-voice
recommendations, and individual engagement of the drivers
with users. Relationships were primarily built while drivers
were still working on the multinational platforms.
Equally, I found out that these groups of drivers include
external intermediaries such as doormen at apartment
complexes, hotels, bars, and clubs who request trips on
passenger’s behalf. Moreover, in these communities there is a
purposive framework of communitarian security mechanisms.
For example, there are mechanisms established for self-defense
against vehicle robbers, community monitoring against police
and other authorities looking to fine them, and even recreational
activities designed to strengthen the group welfare.
Considering the described context, I develop this article by
investigating two cities in Colombia and analyze how
communities develop their own peer governance models. I
study the characteristics of the online “communities-
platforms” to see how the structural arrangements and
relationships within them are enforced. Here, I intend to
discover how governance norms are developed within these
communities, how horizontally or vertically structured the
hierarchy of these online communities are, and what the
legitimacy of these structures and norms are. Finally, I
examine the nature of peer-to-peer relationships in relation to
that governance structure, and what the process of accountability
(if any) is to which community managers are submitted to.
To evaluate the governance structure of these communities-
platforms in Colombia, I discuss the conceptualization of
platform cooperativism (Scholz and Schneider, 2017); its
further analysis in the literature for the issue of ridesharing
platforms Solel (2019, 254–59) can form a suitable theoretical
framework. The latter is also embedded in the discipline of
platform urbanism. I also consider literature on platform
governance Martin et al. (2017, 1396–98) and cite one
example coming from the Global North (Stocker and
Stephens, 2019), as these are useful to study these online
communities-platforms.
Due to the elusive nature of driver’s online communities-
platforms, I employ a range of different sources and methods to
analyze them. First, I engage with traditional media reporting.
Second, I develop in-depth unstructured interviews with
members of these online communities-platforms in one of the
studied cities, as well as conducting informal ride-conversations.
Third, I carried out an online unobtrusive observation (Salmons,
2014) of online communities-platforms.
The nature of the studied communities, and how their
governance evolves, demonstrates the need to observe their
practices and produce new terminologies, while theorizing
about alternative organizational forms in the Global South.
This coincides with the institutional impacts of platforms in
those contexts. Therefore, I will argue in this article that it is
necessary to revise theoretical positions on the nature of the firm
and of organizations, as their application to observable practices
is not straightforward in the case of the Global South.
In abstract economic theories of the firm (Coase, 1937), it is
common to take the institutional structure for granted and
“formality” as a given. It is also implicitly, although wrongly,
assumed that well-defined property rights and reliable law
enforcement are universal, as in neoclassical models. In
southern cities, this is often not the case. Within these
contexts, I argue that it is common for people to associate and
innovate, and it is this type of innovation built out of individual
ingenuity and communal links that can be the basis for a different
understanding of platformed associations.
To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first studies
addressing the relationships, structures, management, and
accountability features emerging from online communities in a
country in the Global South. I begin this article with a brief
discussion of the data, methodology, strategies, and ethical
implications linked to the online methods used for this
research (James and Busher, 2009; Salmons, 2014, 154).
Furthermore, I develop a theoretical framework and critically
discuss platform urbanism, platform governance, platform
cooperativism, and the need to reconsider some of its
propositions. In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on the
case studies and discuss the empirical findings in each of them.
I conclude the article with comments on what the emerging
literature on platforms could learn from the specific
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particularities of these different types of online communities-
platforms in urban environments. Moreover, I comment on what
the institutional ecosystem of transportation in Colombian cities
and other places of the Global South can harness from these
alternative governance models.
DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND ETHICS
This study builds on previous engagements with the impact of
platforms in cities in the Global South, which we could include in
the emerging discipline of platform urbanism, here focused on
urban transportation (Granero-Realini and Bercovich, 2018;
Reilly and Lozano-Paredes, 2019). For this specific article, I
engage with an interpretivist paradigm, looking at how drivers
of online “communities-platforms” are constantly involved in
interpreting their world and in developing meanings for their
activities. Furthermore, I adopt an interpretative stance on the
phenomenon being explored and thus inform the way in which
theory is applied to the discussion and the conclusions of this
article. This methodology is also informed by my personal
context, perspectives, and lived experience in Colombia and
Latin America.
I use an instrumental case study approach as a methodology
strategy (Yin, 2009) to engage with the studied online
communities-platforms. I selected two online communities in
the cities of Bogotá and Cali to uncover the themes on peer
governance dilemmas that this article addresses. These case
studies are “Drivers Club Bogotá” in the city of Bogotá,
together with “Los Sellos” in the city of Cali.
For this article, part of the discussion and conclusion is built
on in-depth unstructured interviews with drivers of online
communities. This field research was carried out in mid- 2018,
and in total I interviewed five drivers (including one
administrator) from the “Los Sellos” community, both male
and female, between the ages of 27 and 52. Each interview
had a duration of approximately 1 h, and all the interviews
were conducted in Spanish, as it is the native language of the
researcher and the interviewees.
Together with the in-depth interviews, I also developed
informal conversations, which I call “ride-conversations”,
which were approximately 30–45 min long in each of the case
studies. These 18 ride-conversations were performed in-situ (10
in Cali, eight in Bogotá) in July 2019, and important insights were
extracted from them, which will be discussed further in the article.
All the interviews were transcribed, and the resulting texts coded
(Saldaña, 2021) and analyzed to find themes related to the
questions on rule creation, hierarchies, relationships, and
manager accountability among online communities. Equally,
the notes emerging from the informal ride-conversations were
coded and analyzed to identify hints related to these topics.
To complement the data from the interviews and informal
ride-conversations, I also conducted online unobtrusive
observation Salmons (2014, 57–9) of posts in the Facebook
group of the “Driver’s Club Bogotá” online community from
March 28, 2017 (creation day of the group) to August 2019. This
Facebook group (Drivers Club Bogotá Blog, 2020) is the only
place on social media where these conversations are publicly
available for this case study. There is no access to the internal
conversations of the Zello Channel or the WhatsApp groups. The
latter would require a structure of participant observation and
being a member of the group, thus interacting with them in that
digital space. This would have implications for the methodology
and the research data collected.
This secondary data also includes a documentary analysis of
traditional media articles. The latter ranges from the first time the
phenomenon of these online communities-platforms was
documented in Colombia in May 2018 to August 2020. This
was done in the national high circulation newspapers EL
TIEMPO and EL ESPECTADOR, together with the regional
newspaper (Cali) EL PAIS. From this data, I took notes,
coded, and analyzed them to find themes related to this
article’s topic. As with the interviews and informal ride-
conversations, this process of analysis was developed in Spanish.
In a context where platform intermediation blurs the lines
between the digital and the physical realm, online research
methods help to engage with the meanings embedded in the
environment in which online communities develop. The usage of
online research refers to a completely new environment in which
peer governance can be studied. Online research, in this case
complementary to in-situ research, also responds and recognizes
the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic which, even if it limits in-
person fieldwork, opens the door to many new opportunities of
engaging with online methods.
Among ethical challenges related to this study, there is the
consideration of issues of informed consent and subject data
protection. For addressing this, I developed the design of the
interviews in a manner which attends to informed consent. I also
ensured that the interviewees clearly understood the associated
risks and benefits related to the study, together with a previous
presentation of the information for an easy opt-out. This was
done with both the formal interviewees and the more informal
ride-conversations with the drivers.
The aim of the informal conversational (Mikkelsen, 1995) for
the case of the “ride-interviews” in the form of unstructured
interview is to uncover strategies of online community members
and what the nature of their organization is. An unstructured
interview or guided conversation was appropriate in this case, as I
wanted to study a range of organizational and networking
strategies among drivers, as well as the behavior of this
particular group. The applied method was a guided
conversation, and each driver was previously briefed about the
interview when boarding the car after requesting one of the
services. Regarding questioning techniques, the interviews were
developed with open-ended questions. The process was
interesting as it necessitated an introduction of the interviewer
that helped to “break the ice” with the driver.
On the other hand, regarding the unobtrusive observation
of the social media groups, I ensured the anonymity of the
subjects when analyzing and publicizing the data in this article.
The discussion on unobtrusive observation in the realm of
online ethnography, however, brings us here to address issues
linked to the “public-private internet continuum” (Salmons,
2014, 156) (Figure 1). In this structure, developed specifically
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for engagement with qualitative online research, there is a large
and somewhat diffuse space of analysis between the private
and the public online environment. This includes an extreme
where data is open to all users to read with a free registration to
the platform, to the other extreme where the data is exclusive
for selected participants, usually needing admission to the
group by the community manager.
Issues on open access and registration definitions are solved
according to the nature of the online space being researched. I
observe what is considered ethically permissible Salmons (2014,
p. 154) ‘if the online setting is perceived as public’. Here, it is
stated that researchers can quote and analyze the information
freely considering the following criteria (James and Busher,
2009):
• That the information of the online forum, group, or
community is officially and publicly archived.
• That no password is required for archive access
• That no site policy explicitly prohibits it
• That the topic is not highly sensitive.
Considering the case of Drivers Club Bogotá (Drivers Club
Bogotá Blog, 2020), it can be attested that all these conditions
were met, and that having a personal Facebook allows for visiting
the pages directly, where the information is publicly accessible,
although authorization is required for accessing the groups.
I can attest that the observations developed for this article are
between the public and private online environment of the internet
continuum. All the social media pages analyzed are open for
access, but the groups required a manager authorization to
participate, which was given in consideration with informed
consent and reaffirmation of the anonymity of members via
Facebook message related to the observation of the group.
Therefore, at least for this specific article, there were no ethical
issues regarding non-obtrusive observation. Registry in the Zello
channel or WhatsApp groups is a further step that did require
internal participation in the online community, and that step was
not taken for data collection linked to this article.
DISCUSSION OF THEORIES, CONCEPTS,
AND FRAMEWORK
There is abundant literature on governance models, and more
recently on peer-to-peer governance, although it is not my
intention in this article to elaborate on a comprehensive
review on this literature. However, I am interested in focusing
on references of governance models emerging in “platformed”
communities and exploring the nature of their structures. At the
same time, there is also an increased emergence in the literature
related to the impacts of platforms in broader institutions and
spaces.
Platform urbanism is a recent and emergent theme in urban
futures’ research and studies. The elaboration of the concept
‘platform capitalism’ termed by Srnicek (2016) helped to frame
platforms in current debates of political economy, especially
considering the increasingly central role of data, instead of
traditional commodities, in the new forms of capitalism. It
was from the recognition that platform capitalism has relevant
and abundant expressions in the urban space that the theme of
‘platform urbanism’ came to be.
Some authors who focus on emerging engagement with
platform urbanism refer to platforms as extractive agents in
the city. For example, Krivý (2016, p.15) sustains the notion
that the effects of platforms in cities are linked to the
accumulation of centralized corporate power and the
reproduction of social inequality linked to the latter. This
perspective on the conflicts emerging from platforms in cites
was addressed even before the emergence of big platforms such as
Uber (Gillespie 2010) in relation with the increasing
accumulation of power for framing the discourse in the
urban space.
However, here I argue that platforms in cities are not only
mechanisms of extraction that could find solutions with the
‘democratization’ proposed by proponents of platform
cooperativism (Scholz, 2016), or entrepreneurial activism
within platforms (Sandoval, 2020). Platforms are also, more
than anything, ecosystems of interaction. They are special and
new social spaces which exponentially expand the ability of
people to interact, building a relational nature that is behind
the creation of all types of markets Brown et al. (2004, p. 747–50).
In this sense, the work of Barns (2020) is very illustrative in
how platform urbanism can be defined and, furthermore, studied.
Barns (2020 p. 21) argues that platform urbanism more than
everything is an urban ecosystem of new relational processes,
building on ‘co-constitutive natures of urban institutions, actors,
governing tactics, modes of expertize, training data, and ways of
knowing and designing cities.’And that in this case, platforms are
actors of the enormous variety of relationships and interactions
which are natural to cities.
Barns (2020) considers that platform urbanism is the
ecosystem which embodies the many ways in which the
interrelations of urban life develop, mediated by platform
technology. Moreover, he believes that platforms are triggering
very specific new forms of interactions, markets, and agency.
Platform technology when interacting with social networks is
also giving strength to new ways of understanding organizations
FIGURE 1 | The public – private internet continuum. source (Salmons
2014, p. 156. Citing Vision2Lead, Inc. 2013).
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and institutions, and the way in which people construct
governance alternatives. There are valuable examples, such as
from Hartl et al. (2016, 2758) and Martin et al. (2017, 1396–97),
focusing on the organizational models for conceptualizing
platform governance.
Martin et al. (2017, 1403–05) in particular offers a framework
which differentiates forms of platform governance and original
ownership. In this framework, the forms of membership and
leadership, as two models of platform governance, are presented
using the example of Freegle: A democratically governed platform
which is deemed to accommodate the values of both platform
users (members) and owners (leaders).
Studying this division shows that more instrumental
structures are held as important by the owners’ side, while
social and environmental values are important for the
members’ side. The differences of these two actors in platform
governance, and how they can create eventual conflict, are
relevant if we are to engage with the hierarchical structures of
any type of platform organizational operation.
Structures of platform governance and how a democratically
or cooperatively managed platform can give better social
outcomes is also the base for the conceptualization of
“platform cooperativism”. Scholz and Schneider (2017, 20–27)
in their work with several other authors on platform cooperatives
show an excellent example of what are we talking about when
engaging with platform impacts on emerging online
communities.
Scholz and Schneider (2017, 9–29) rightly present that the
business model of centralized multinational platforms of the
“sharing economy” reproduce characteristics of profit capture
from operators in a monopolized or oligopolies marketplace. In
this case, the situation is not different or innovative in relation
with other capitalist forms. Equally, they argue that a centralized
model does not necessarily give agency and power to its users, or
the “members” side if we are to use the classification termed by
Martin et al. (2017, 1405).
The response of the authors involved in this literature is the
advocacy toward cooperative platforms as a model to confront
the centralized multinational structures of “sharing economy”
platforms. These platforms are framed as community builders but
engage with members exclusively as costumers. As Tonkinwise,
(2017) states (in Scholz and Schneider, 2017, 128–9) states,
platform cooperatives are therefore deemed as an opportunity
for designing and reviving the project of establishing a genuine
sense of community.
In this narrative on platform cooperatives, it is also recognized
that we as a culture are becoming more cooperative. Commons-
based peer production is an example of the possibility of large-
scale enterprises using models of platform governance (Benkler,
2017 in Scholz and Schneider, 2017, 91–5). However, this
literature also acknowledges that decentralized governance
forms in platforms do not imply horizontality. There is a need
to engage with the idea that the communities behind these
platforms both give value and build it for society at large
(Fuster-Morell, 2017 in Scholz and Schneider, 2017, 213–7).
Moreover, the structuring of platform cooperatives is argued
as being an issue of stakeholder interdependence rather than
autonomy, agency, and independence of individual actors. There
is a push to abandon the emphasis on autonomy by previous
cooperative conceptual engagements and embracing the idea of
community interdependence. The goals of egalitarianism,
democratic governance, and equity are now facilitated by
platform technology (Rushkoff, 2017 in Scholz and Schneider,
2017, 33–7; Hoover 2017, in Scholz and Schneider, 2017, 108–12).
Both the theoretical structuring of platform cooperatives
and the impact of the platform economy at large are
complemented by another contribution which is also useful
for the development of this article: A typology of the different
characteristics and impacts of the platform economy, which is
elaborated by Solel (2019, 247), being especially operative for
engaging with the governance of platform and platformed
communities. Solel’s classification is useful to differentiate
between platform capitalism, the sharing economy, and
platform cooperativism. Moreover, the classification
provides a clear structure for the elements of platform
governance, including ownership of the platforms and
decision-making within them.
In the realm of the “platform economy”, ownership is defined
by this author as belonging to private individuals or companies,
with multiple shareholders and no relation between ownership,
control of the platform, and its use (Solel, 2019, 256). Equally,
“decisions” or decision-making is deemed exclusive to the
owners, who are accountable only to the shareholders (Solel,
2019, 256). As what is classified as “sharing economy” goes
beyond the original definition of this phenomenon, Solel
(2019, 257) rightly observes that ownership for this case is varied.
“Sharing economy enterprises can use all forms of
ownership. They may be owned by a public
authority, a non-profit, users or some users, or by a
private company”.
Here, decision-making is assigned as determined by the
owners and emerges in various combinations and forms. For
platform cooperativism, however, the definitions provided are
more nuanced and establish that in the case of ownership, it lies
on the side of the users:
“The owners of platform cooperatives are the users. In
certain cases, they can be some of the users – like
service-providers who are members, while the
consumers are not, or consumers who are members
purchasing from non-members. Another option is of a
multi-stakeholder cooperative combined of private
individuals of different groups, or a combination of
private individuals and a public authority. In other
cases, ownership can be of a non-profit or public
authority, as long as the decision makers are the
members;” (Solel, 2019, 259).
This “design guide” of what defines the governance of platform
cooperatives is a very powerful tool which attests to the diversity
and flexibility of the structures present in platform cooperativism.
Defined here also is its decision making as a democratic
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organization, linked to the basics of cooperativism (one owner,
one vote).
Observing the framework proposed by Solel (2019), I observe
that the legal definitions of cooperatives linked to the
development of “platform cooperatives” are not to be forcibly
intertwined. There is the need for more flexible definitions that
would help us to engage with the characteristics of the platform
economy and its effects in new forms of organizations and their
governance.
“Platform Cooperatives” in this sense are understood in this
article not as a legal association or established institution or
organization. Rather, it is a theoretical term in which the
democratic governance of the emerging type of platform
organization is central to its definition.
However, it is also interesting to consider the characteristics of
these types of organizations when emerging from online
communities in low institutionalization contexts. One example
is “Arcade City”, a network that grew out of a fragile governance
context (Stocker and Stephens, 2019). This platform evolved from
social networking in Facebook, which emerged at the time thanks
to the platforms Uber and Lyft stopping their service in Austin,
Texas, due to regulatory failure and conflicts with the local
government.
In its evolution, the platform started with a preserved
interdependency between stakeholders, observable in its
functionality (Stocker and Stephens, 2019, 19–24). This
online community however, evolved toward a natural
hierarchization. The platform showed that beyond an
intention of horizontality and community building, a clear
structure emerged which centralized its hierarchy in the
function of the original community managers (the initiators
and “owners” of the platform). These managers, despite issues
not pertinent to this article and the fluctuation between roles,
preserved their position in the continuing evolution of the
community (Facebook, 2020a).
Observing the example of Arcade City, it can be argued that
although interdependence and full horizontal democratic
decision-making is a laudable goal exposed by the
conceptualization of platform cooperativism (as seen in the
work of Solel, 2019 and Scholz and Schneider, 2017), the
articulation of platform cooperatives will tend to be less
egalitarian and more meritocratic. Hierarchies even when
developing processes of mutual coordination, (or what
Bauwens et al. (2019, 19) denominate as stigmergic
collaboration) necessarily develop as a process of governance.
Governance that needs a managing actor, the benevolent dictator,
emerges naturally in these communities.
Institutional characteristics of markets in the Latin American
context Schneider (2013, 15–18) are the reason for this
differentiated evolution. Hierarchies, clientelism, and a favor
toward certain groups of interest over others have meant that
people no longer trust hierarchies -of exclusion- and work against
them for both communal and individual interest. To a point that
acknowledges the enabling effects of technology, the government
and the corporations are regarded as unnecessary, and people are
no longer looking for their approval or help to build new
alternatives of well-being.
Those processes of transformation, however, cannot escape
the evolving nature of hierarchies built out of meritocracy, linked
to the first “entrepreneur” who, by the nature of its idea,
transforms automatically into the owner. This then replaces
the hierarchies of exclusion of Latin American capitalism
Schneider (2013, 15–23) with internal governance structures in
their online communities. In turn, this ends up giving its
members the conditions that the alternatives within the
structures of government regulation and multinational
corporations cannot provide.
There is a need for further research mapping of the emerging
governance models and analysis of them as to their success for
delivering social and economic benefits. For this article, the
literature on platform cooperatives and peer-to-peer
governance is useful in articulating the nature of the studied
online communities and gives hints on their structure. Equally,
previous and seminal engagements in organizational theory, such
as the garbage can model of organized anarchies Cohen et al.
(1972, 1–5), help us to traduce the nature of structures growing
from informal or not clearly defined settings.
However, all this literature falls short on engaging with the
paradox where horizontal structures of interdependency
naturally and unequivocally evolve to centralized hierarchical
systems. The latter talks to us about how the agency, autonomy,
and independence of individual actors, in this case, the managers’
role, cannot be ignored by having an aspirational ideal of absolute
equality and interdependence in platform cooperativism. Equally,
it refers to the individual agency of members, who articulate
themselves into this communitarian structures but do not
abandon their own interests, especially in terms of economic gain.
It is the purpose of this article then to contribute to the mapping of
different governancemodels that are happening in online communities
and to look for a new model. In the following sections, this article will
engage with two selected online communities. It will study themwithin
the previously analyzed theories and concepts and the research
questions linked to this article: How governance norms are
developed, what the structure of their hierarchies is, their legitimacy
and the nature of peer relationships, and the process of accountability
for those who are high in the structure.
DRIVER’S CLUB BOGOTÁ (BOGOTÁ,
COLOMBIA)
As stated by this community’s name, the idea behind its
organization started, and is still perceived by the members and
the administrators, as a “Club”. However, its organization goes
beyond the conceptualization of a club, and denotes the presence
of a more sophisticated construction of governance structures.
The community was begun in October 2017 by a group of
drivers from multinational platforms such as Uber, Cabify, DiDi,
Beat, and others which are active in the city of Bogotá. It’s main
purpose at the beginning, according to the founder, was to “Help
each other on night shifts on the apps, just to hold a conversation
and alert everyone if there were any problems” – Pedro (founder
of the community, - named changed for anonymity).
Equally, as the founder comments:
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“We were drivers of apps who had other occupations,
and this was a complementary job to sustain our
families, and it was interesting to find people in a
similar situation”.
Furthermore, what started as a WhatsApp group built from
some drivers who met at the “activation” days of the
multinational platforms, kept growing into an online
community. This community turned to be mostly based on a
Facebook group (created by the original drivers), and amounts to
6,000 members as of 2020 (Drivers Club Bogotá Blog, 2020).
Currently, this group has framed its own branding, a high level of
audiovisual production, centralized messages from the
administrators (the original founders of the group), and even a
website (Drivers Club Bogotá Blog, 2020).
The growth of the first WhatsApp group, the creation of
others, and their development in the Facebook group was first
linked to their utility in sharing information on accidents, traffic,
and the presence of police checkpoints in the city. The third point
was so these checkpoints could be avoided because, as I
mentioned before, drivers are in peril of losing their licenses
or receiving high fines due to their work on the platforms.
Moreover, the expansion of this specific online community is
also linked to platforms such as Uber using cash payments in
Colombia (Uber Blog Colombia, 2017). This payment system is
designed in a way that every time a driver takes a cash payment, it
incurs a debt to the platform for the cost of the commission. This
allows Uber and other companies to expand their service and
critical mass, being sustained every time a passenger uses the
service by credit card payment, when the commission debt
is paid.
This, however, created an incentive for drivers to avoid credit
card transactions completely, by building more direct relations
with customers, and leaving multinational platforms if the debt
amounted to an unpayable state. There is no shared information
between systems and platforms and no traceable credit history for
drivers, so they can do this freely.
Members of Drivers Club Bogotá started to develop direct
relationships with their customers (users) who were usually either
drivers of other platforms or people from their immediate social
circle who were also members of the WhatsApp groups. This
prompted drivers to abandon the platforms altogether and begin
to use the WhatsApp groups as their way of contacting members
and developing all their payments using cash.
Equally, drivers started to use the Facebook group of Drivers
Club Bogotá and their own WhatsApp groups to establish a
system in which if one of the drivers is contacted directly by a
user, and it cannot provide the ride, it locates some other driver
who is near and can effectively do it. The governance of these first
groups did not represent any costs for members and it was
exclusively built on community links and social capital.
Development of Governance Norms
As I mentioned above, the online community evolved from a
uniqueWhatsApp group into several WhatsApp groups and then
into a Facebook group (Drivers Club Bogotá Blog, 2020) which
united all the drivers providing this form of decentralized cash-
based ride service. This went alongside an emergent system of
collaboration for ride-provision, and no clear hierarchies or
structures of governance, nor specific rules. There were only
informal processes of community membership that evolved from
social links.
However, member growth produced a big evolution and
change in these structures. In October 2018, the first evidence
of governance documentation emerged, which established the
different norms regarding the inclusion of drivers into a
centralized communication channel powered by the “Zello”
app. This mobile application works as a push-to-talk walkie
talkie in exclusive channels and became a definitive tool for
platform drivers who were already members of the online
community.
Members of Driver’s Club Bogotá were prompted (Drivers
Club Bogotá Blog, 2020) by the founders to join a centralized
Zello channel with the narrative and framing of it being a support
network and facilitating the growth of the community. This
support network claimed to be the new place to report the
state of the road, traffic congestion, police checkpoints, expand
cash-payable rides (as the contacts from drivers on WhatsApp
groups were harnessed), and give security support in case of
robbery or other incidents.
Among the normatively of the “Zello” channel, as observed in
a post in their Facebook page, it was established that:
1. On the community chat no memes, jokes, chains, or religious
images were allowed.
2. Commercial publications, including sales, products, and
service offerings, have a cost and are canalized by the
administrators.
3. The main report and communication channel is Zello, and
WhatsApp groups were now to be limited to the
announcement of dates for progressive activation of
members into the Zello channel.
4. Any disrespectful conduct or insulting vocabulary will result in
immediate expulsion from the Zello channel.
5. Permanence in the community was linked to the following of
these fundamental rules. Non-compliance results in expulsion,
and if expelled an undefined economic penalty will be charged
for re-admission.
Moreover, the organization on this centralized channel also
created codes and keywords that were of mandated use for being
part of the community. These codes include references to:
• Estimated Time of Arrival (EW)
• Rest for Coffee, Smoking, or for a “Express
Conversation” (R6)





• Suspect situation – approach other members
• “Pending”
• “User”
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• Real-time location (20W)
• No news – “all good” (X3)
• “Wife” or “Husband”
• Report of situation for precaution





• Senior (ROBLE – “Oak” in Spanish)
This use of alphanumeric or purely numeric codes evolved
from more than solely a communication efficiency device to a
management tool to organize the processes of the community.
The organization of these language codes and governance
rules, including the policies for termination of membership and
exclusion of the community, shifted the structures of Driver’s
Club Bogotá’s Facebook community and their WhatsApp groups.
Even if membership was not enforced and signing in to the Zello
channel was not mandated (yet), it produced a hierarchization
that was not present before.
A soft introduction of governance rules for the use of the Zello
channel was framed together with the benefits of belonging to this
centralized form of communication, and to a narrative of
community growth as a “big family”. Monetary and price
incentives were also announced in the (Facebook, 2020a)
group to promote the participation of drivers. Furthermore,
the introduction of the Zello channel and the rules associated
to it came together with an association with other groups of
drivers of different types of vehicles, including trucks, minivans,
and even motorcycles (providing moto-taxi services).
Expansion and association with other groups and other digitally
based communities for transportation provision was commanded by
the original communitymembers andmanagers, but especially by its
original founder and leader. This entrepreneurial leader, with a
charismatic personality and persuasion abilities, has been framing a
brand for himself and the community, and this has become clearer as
the community has grown.
Hierarchies and Structures
Driver’s Club Bogotá, before the centralization attempts in the
Zello channel, was a somewhat loose community of drivers who
started to organize to support each other and then structured an
informal mode (built from social and community relationships).
This process was known to the founders who encouraged it and
even participated in it.
At first there was not a clear organizational model, nor a
defined way to structure decision-making. It was an emergent and
organic community of cooperation, which we could map with the
diagram (Figure 2) in the concluding thoughts.
This first structure was built on informal structures and by the
free association of members, who formed a hierarchy primarily
based on members cooperation but also on individual interest in
coming together to provide more efficient ride services, and thus
earning more money. To this effect, we cannot refer to this first
structure as either platform cooperativism, using Solel’s (2019)
typology, and nor it can be related to the conceptualization of a
“sharing economy” heterodox platform. This order was
spontaneous and classifiable within the characteristics of an
organized anarchy present in the structures of the garbage can
model of organizations (Cohen et al., 1972).
The first build-up of governance for Drivers Club Bogotá was
decided on an anarchic and incremental process, in which
decision-making evolved through the horizontal input of
members. There were members who came up with the idea
(not the creators of the Facebook/WhatsApp groups or would-
be administrators) of using WhatsApp to connect with
customers, and the administration of that communication fell
upon those drivers who came up with the idea. Neither was there
a clear authority beyond participants who became decision-
makers in the creation of the groups.
However, further expansion of the community happened
when the administrators and original founders of the online
group created the “Zello” channel and started their process of
centralization. These administrators were always the same six
individuals, original founders of the platform, and their
intervention re-arranged the structure of the community
organization (Figure 3).
A hierarchical structural organization with an organized
anarchical evolving process rapidly and drastically was
transformed into a hierarchical organization. The leadership
role that was assumed by the administrators, and especially by
the founder, who also became a spokesperson when issues of
rideshare platforms emerged in the national debate (RCN, 2020).
The leaders control the communities, manage and organize the
payments, and keep the accounts, which gives them the advantage
to situate themselves, not formally, but tacitly, at the top of the
hierarchy – thus transforming hierarchies into hierarchies.
FIGURE 2 | Driver’s club Bogotá original heterarchy source: elaborated
by the author.
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Even though the enforcement of rules of the Zello channel
does not apply to the whole community (as in not all members are
required to sign into the centralized structure) there is a process of
exclusion-inclusion around the Zello channel, leaving members
of theWhatsApp groups out. On the other hand, newmembers of
the (Facebook, 2020c) group, or those who came to the
community by means other than the original WhatsApp
groups, are also joining the Zello channel, and incorporating
to the structure in its recent form. These newer users are unaware
of the previous hierarchical construction.
The centralization of the structure means that the decision-
making process transformed from an organized anarchy into a
different combination in which democratic structures are not
present. The decision to centralize into a Zello channel was
made exclusively by the founders of the original communities
with a great risk: The non-validation of the members of the
community could have caused its disintegration. However, the
Zello channel introduction was successful and members
accepted the new hierarchies without visible conflicts, leading
us to question the issues of legitimacy and accountability of the
administrators and the imposed hierarchy in the online
community.
Legitimacy and Accountability
An easy transformation of a governance structure from a loose
hierarchy or organized anarchy into a clear hierarchy where
decision-making was allocated to managerial individuals
suggests ideas about a natural legitimacy by these managers.
This legitimacy however does not necessarily come from leader
popularity, which could refer to an election process. Rather, it
emerges from a transactional articulation, in whichmembers cede
their “sovereignty” in decision-making in exchange for the
benefits of community membership.
Accepting the new structure is incentivized by mediation
delegation, an increase in business, and a sense of community
that is framed by the recreational and communal activities
developed by the administrator. As told by a community
member named Juliana (name changed for anonymity):
“The Zello channel is way more convenient, before in
the WhatsApp groups there was no clarity on who was
going to take the ride, and many times I lost passengers,
with the Zello group I know exactly where to go and
who to pick up.”
According to one administrator named Fernando (named
changed for anonymity), it was clear when the community
began to grow beyond a manageable point and the decision of
creating the Zello channel was a necessary opportunity:
“We decided to use the Zello app when drivers started to
have problems with WhatsApp, there were too many of
them. We were happy but needed this app to provide
better services, especially whenmore of our drivers were
relying only on the WhatsApp thing, they quit the
apps.”
The willingness of drivers not just to quit the established
platforms, i.e., Uber, but also to join these groups and accept the
soft imposition of governance rules linked to the Zello
community talks to us about a calculation and acceptance of
risk. Members of the community report that joining Drivers Club
FIGURE 3 | Driver’s club Bogotá current hierarchy source: elaborated by the author.
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Bogotá, even when not working with the multinational platforms,
is a risk worth taking. It is a way to gain more money and avoid
the problems of rate settlement and complaint mechanisms of
multinational platforms.
Equally the administrators of the online community have been
smart in framing a brand specifically linked to the Zello channel.
This branding includes the promotion of community cohesion
which includes social events, parties (online parties during the
COVID-19 lockdown), trips to nearby tourist locations, and the
articulation of sanitary and cleaning rules for the post-lockdown
return to work. All these strategies for social cohesion are framed
exclusively for members who have already signed to the Zello
channel and are well perceived and embraced by the community
members.
As exposed by Santiago (named changed for anonymity):
“The Zello channel is the best way to find out about
what’s going on, and even during the lockdown we got
messages everyday asking us to be together as a family.
Asking God to help us all. I felt that we were a family in
these times”.
Members clearly assign legitimacy to their membership in the
community, no matter the governance model. They recognize
that these schemes are a way to achieve personal gain, in some
cases even growing what they define as a “self-managed micro-
business” with their own vehicles and improving their working
conditions. Female drivers for example even attest that they enjoy
the security that passengers are vetted by trusted community
members, and the Zello channel has demonstrated a more
efficient way to connect with fares during dead hours when
markets are saturated.
All of this refers to a cohesive community that shows no
special interest in the characteristics of decision-making in the
organization and does not show evidence of concern with the
structures of the hierarchy they tacitly joined. This then leads to
the main problem in the accountability of administrators:
accountability is virtually non-existent. There is no process or
channel to question the structures of the authority, the selected
language for the online community, or the rules of permanence. If
one of the governance rules is broken and the member is expelled,
there is no mechanism for appealing or returning beyond
payment of a monetary penalty.
Additionally, other elements for the functioning and definition
of the community have no process of discussion or contestation.
Fare rates are defined by the community administrators daily
using the application Blumeter, which bases its tariffs according
to the price of Uber rates, minus the commission. This
application works as a taximeter to manage trips and calculate
in real-time the price of the trip, personalize values, use dynamic
rates, see details of the trip, and calculate return. The
independence that the use of this application could mean in
terms of tariff definitions, for example allowing individual drivers
to lower their rates to become more competitive, is restricted by
the centralized administration of the community.
These structures raise the question of how cooperative this
platform can be if decision-making and leadership is extremely
centralized and, we could say, authoritarian. Even if this authority
is coming from benevolent dictators. It certainly does not meet the
definitions surrounding platform cooperativism (Scholz and
Schneider, 2017 and Solel, 2019, 259), and comes close to a
structure that is not far from the extractive structures of platform
capitalism (Solel, 2019, 256).
In the “platform” created by Drivers’ Club Bogotá, owners are
making decisions and are not accountable to members (although
theymay be accountable to other stakeholders). However, it could
be argued that ownership is not exclusive to the administrators, as
there are no specific profits or dividends that the community is
creating for itself. The profit generation rests in the drivers who
“own” the platform, even if submitted to an unaccountable
governance hierarchy. I argue then that these emergent
platforms fit with the intended governance model of a
“sharing economy” Solel (2019, 257) where enterprises can use
all forms of ownership in a flexible manner, profits are made by
members, and decision-making is carried out through a variety of
ways, determined by the owners.
In the following, I will discuss the other case study of this
article which, even if similar in evolution, has a different process
and structure which will be interesting to engage with. We will see
that the presence of this, and many other groups which the scope
of this article is not able to cover, already gives us evidence of the
diversity of governance models and how the classification of
“sharing economies” could be correctly applied to them.
LOS SELLOS (CALI, COLOMBIA)
As observed in the discussions on different (Facebook, 2020b)
groups, interviews, and in traditional media, Cali, the second
largest city in Colombia, was the birthplace of the phenomenon of
drivers creating alternative “platforms” from their online
communities. This process was attested to in my own previous
research Reilly and Lozano-Paredes (2019, 431), and equally
identified very early by media reporting (El Pais, 2018).
The online community of drivers, known colloquially as “Los
Sellos”, gains its name from the use of a Zello channel, similar to
the structure of “Driver’s Club Bogotá”. (They have used several
names for their group, but their external identification and
recognition by society has not followed suit). Similar to the
previous case, “Los Sellos” emerged first from two big
WhatsApp groups made up of drivers from Uber and similar
multinational platforms. These groups evolved organically from
drivers who met in different circumstances, including the
“activation” days at the multinational platforms’ offices, and
social media groups dedicated to “drivers” of different platforms.
One of the WhatsApp groups was formed by approximately
200 drivers in late 2017, and the other one by 100 drivers the
same year. In general, and again like the case of Driver’s Club
Bogotá, these groups served at their start as a support network to
share information regarding authorities’ checkpoints, traffic
jams, accidents, etc. Likewise, if a driver was contacted
directly by one of its clients (with whom the drivers build
loyalty and community links) and cannot provide the service,
whichever member of the group is closest can carry out the ride.
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This mediation generally involved no cost to members and was
handled informally.
I could note from the discussions emerging from the case in
Bogotá that drivers took the idea of creating the WhatsApp
groups for building a “platform” of ride-hailing services
specifically from this group in Cali. Equally, there were direct
references from drivers in this city, bringing their experience to
the group of Driver’s Club Bogotá. Furthermore, issues of
legitimacy and accountability of managers were also replicated,
even if the hierarchies are somewhat vague.
The experience of “Los Sellos” has a particularity in its
evolution which can help to illuminate the debate: It resulted
in the creation of financial collaborative structures, cooperation
with external actors, and the geographical division of the city to
avoid competition. All of this emerged from the collaborative
structure and defined its increasing popularity, how it competes
with multinational platforms, and how it inspires business
models of local enterprises (VICE, 2019).
Development of Governance Norms
From the informal modes related to one of the identified
WhatsApp groups, administrators centralized their efforts by
using the Zello channel. However, there is evidence that,
separate from the case of Bogotá, these administrators
submitted to the community the decision of using the Zello
channel. Moreover, they even voted on the WhatsApp group
on the conditions for the structuring of the new “platform”
around Zello.
It is clear that the reduced number of group members helped
this organizational level. Even if they opened their WhatsApp
groups beyond the 256 members limit, their group fluctuates to
date between 290–310 drivers, which reduced scalability but
allowed for a smoother organizational process.
When the first Zello channel for this group was created in
January 2018, the following rules were submitted for
consideration of the online community, as informed by one of
the managers:
1. All the members of the group must own their own car, or if
they are doing work for a patron, the patron should also be a
member of the group.
2. If a driver wants to be added to the Zello channel, it is necessary
that an “active member” nominates him (It is not clearly
defined what it is meant by “active” member).
3. There is a one-time fee for entering the group of $100.000
Colombian pesos (approximately 27 US Dollars)
4. There is a monthly fee of $40.000 Colombian pesos
(approximately 11 US Dollars). If the member does not pay
that monthly fee, they are excluded from the platform. If they
pay again, they are let back in.
5. All the collected money goes to a “collaborative fund” destined
to the “administration” of the platform. More important is the
payment of fees for recovering vehicles confiscated by
authorities. (Confiscated in this case due to the previously
mentioned legal limbo in which this type of transportation
service experiences in the country.)
6. All earnings are for drivers or their patrons.
Separate from the case of Driver’s Club Bogotá, governance
documentation is not available anywhere in the social media
groups of the drivers, but rather in internal chats and memos. The
characteristics of these rules are bound to be more fluid, as they
were told to the researcher by drivers themselves, and not by a
specific document that is available in their groups.
However, it is interesting to point out here how the
development of governance rules in this case is structured not
on a community construction (as could be argued for the case of
Driver’s Club Bogotá), but in the clear mechanisms of payment
and the creation of common funds for the group. These rules also
cover cases in which a member owns more than one car and puts
other drivers to work for him or her, under the accepted norms of
the online community. It should also be noted that the association
process for these drivers, and their collaborative funding creation,
does not suppress either their individual interest nor their search
for profit.
In other words, the money they add to the collaborative fund for
the growth of the community and for self-preservation against
punitive measures of the authorities does not transform into a
common pool of earnings. I could even argue here, from the
conversations with the drivers, that if individual earnings were to
be added to the “collaborative fund” and then distributed
democratically, the community organization would collapse, as the
drivers would quit.
The financial structure that surrounds governance of this
online community is furthermore complemented by the
creation of a codified language of communication, which helps
with the structuring of the “platform”. But, and again, this is
different from the previously studied case, as the language is more
reduced and lacks elements of community-building and welfare,
which are replaced by fund structure and management. These
codes include references to:




• “Suspended member” (MS)
• “Report” (RE)
• “Payment” (PA)”
These codes are available in the public access page of the Zello
channels online and were provided by one of the interviewed
members.
This group has five clearly defined leaders who manage the
Zello channel and expand the structure of the community,
making use of the “collaborative fund” to add innovation that
is not present in the other case study in Bogotá. There are also
some other organizational innovative structures which engage
with internal and external competition.
Hierarchies and Structures
Due to security concerns in this Colombian city, it is very
common for people living in middle-class gated community
buildings (a prevalent urban housing form in Colombia), to
rely on security guards for ordering a ride from trusted
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sources. This is a process that continues to be applied for ordering
regular taxi cabs, for example.
The structure of this case for “Los Sellos” depends heavily
on an association with those security guards. In this case, the
administrators of the group make use of the “collaborative
fund” (which, making a quick calculation of annual income,
amounts to roughly $144,000,000 Colombian pesos (41,900 US
dollars), not counting the entry fee) to pay these security
guards $1,000 Colombian pesos (Approximately 0.27 US
Dollars) for each ride they can pitch in. Equally, they pay
them $80,000 Colombian pesos (Approximately 22 US dollars)
as an incentive if they can get 50 rides in seven days. This
association is crucial for the governance structures that are
formed in the online community, as the security guards are not
members of the group, but certainly articulate within its
structures and have direct communication with the
administrators.
There is also evidence in this online community that the group
has structured itself geographically to divide the areas of coverage
in the city. This is to avoid direct competition between members
and to increase the scope of possible users, as well as daily
earnings. Geographical divisions are assigned by selection of
the drivers, or if that is not accommodating, by a draw of
drivers and locations. It should be noted that these allocations
are not permanent.
As was stated by one of the managers of the Zello channel (El
País, 2018):
“We divide the city so that when a client requests the
service, we can supply it in the shortest possible time
and thus compete face to face with taxis and Ubers. . .
. . .In the south of the city for example we have a group
of 50 partners dedicated to just four neighborhoods, and
then another group for the Universities”
– Miguel (Manager – name changed for anonymity).
Considering all the above-mentioned elements, and the nature
of rule and decision-making in this online community, we could
define this governance structure as a democratic entity of self-
interested individuals with external allies. There is also a reliance
on the mutually accorded decision of territorial divide. This
allocation into democratic decision is very relevant here, as we
could easily adapt the framework of platform cooperativism Solel
(2019, 259) into it.
Ownership of this online community its allocated to their
members and administrators alike, and the profits are destined to
both the individual driver, but also by fee payment to the fund for
advancing the community’s goals. Equally, decision-making is
democratic, helped here again by the stable low scale of the group,
if we are to compare it with the numbers of the case study in
Bogotá.
The structure for this community-platform can be mapped by
the diagram (Figure 4) in the concluding thoughts.
LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
On legitimacy among members and administrators, it is
interesting to engage with an element which emerged in one
of the ride-conversations in Cali. One driver named Mauricio
(named changed for anonymity) has a view on the legality and
FIGURE 4 | Los Sellos horizontal heterarchySource: Elaborated by the author.
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legitimacy of belonging to the group, which sheds light on the
governance of the community but also its perception to members:
“This is not a platform that has all the problems of Uber
and its “friends”. . .We don’t have all those problems
that other drivers have with the dynamic rates, and the
commission payments. . .
. . .Besides, we are not giving money to the companies
from abroad, this is all for ourselves. We came together
to work, and this is different from Uber and its legal
problems, we are not illegal.”
This perception, which is no doubt wrong, as individually
providing transportation services for a profit in Colombia is still
illegal, do attest however to the nature of belonging of the
drivers and their interest in working in this online community.
A sense of legitimacy is added by removing the corporative
element of multinational platforms such as Uber, and
embracing the ideas of locality, nationality, and work and
dignity.
Community building is perceived as important in the legitimacy
of “Los Sellos”, but the access to work and the ability to use this
online community as a leverage mechanism to be able to receive
economic gain is what assures its permanence. Linked to this is that
the structures of the community and the role of the administrators is
not put into doubt.
Drivers agree that the submission to vote on the original
governance decisions, including the functioning of the
collaborative fund, rates, and the association with security
guards, kept them “at peace” with the way the community is
organized. Moreover, drivers are also happy with the
arrangement in which, different to what happens in the
previous case study, administrators do not define centralized
rates. Each member has a “Taximetro” app, easily downloadable
from the online stores, then a daily rate per distance/time is
suggested by administrators, but drivers are free to modify them
and lower the price if they want to be more competitive externally
(in relation to other drivers on other platforms).
Elements of free association and participation on decision-
making, which includes both the original decisions and the daily
suggestion of rates in the Zello group, leads to a smooth
acceptance of the authority of the administrators. Interests are
still cohesive as each individual driver offers their position and the
community acts as an advantage mechanism.
Conflicts haven’t emerged as it is not a standardized organization;
it may emerge in the future with their platformization – but is not a
union, not a guild, not a company, but instead is an association of
individuals with a specific purpose who have created other “services”
and “benefits” for themselves. However, the democratic characteristic
of decision-making in this online community does not eliminate
issues of accountability in the organization. There are problematic
aspects which are hidden in the acceptance of the governance
structure. These are problems located in the lack of mechanisms
for conflict resolution inside the community, and especially in the
unbalanced power that the patrons (owners ofmore than one vehicle,
who have people working for them) have over other drivers.
Equally, it is interesting to ask here if the decision-making even
is democratic, and is not affected by the imposition of the
administrators’ ideas, position in the hierarchy, and agency.
That is, administrators as founders could enjoy a tacit
advantage as the “creators” of the idea, as the articulators of
the governance structures, as those with the association with
security guards, and as those who manage the collaborative fund.
I was not able to find evidence among the members of
mechanisms in which they could propose new ways in which
the community could work and submit it for a vote by the group.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the collaborative fund has
some sort of audit regarding its use beyond the administrators.
Even if there are no traces of corruption, visible in complaints by
community members for example, it could be argued that the
managing of monetary resources in many cases can lead to some
level of embezzlement.
Nevertheless, there is a clear element of trust between
members that is strengthened by the reduced amount of
people in the online community, and the vetted association of
any new driver. For the time being, this community of “Los
Sellos”, in a similar fashion to the case of “Driver’s Club Bogotá”,
still enjoys an inertia as its growth is not planned, and informal
trust mechanisms are preserved. The community works because
of its previous arrangements and grows according to an
incremental process. However, if the community were to grow
far beyond its inception, I argue that problems of corruption or
power dynamics could easily emerge.
Colombia and Latin America have a context where institutions
do not perform as expected because laws, regulations, and
organized governance generally does not apply as is intended.
There is a process among the population of diminished trust in
the government’s functions and its institutions. However, there is
also a cultural phenomenon of trust-building and organization
between the population Rosario Maritza (2017, 5–6), which can
easily be classified as trust between peers if it were to be analyzed
under a framework of the literature related to the organizations
evolving from platforms in the region.
Trust between peers in Latin America is built by citizens in a
process of collective action that demonstrates the organizational
capacity of individuals with a common goal. This collaboration is in
most cases public, spontaneous, and non-recurrent (Rosario
Maritza, 2017, 6). It is this trust that is behind the development
of online communities in Latin America and Colombia, and it is
easily detected in the language that is used by the members of the
online communities in their social media interactions, but is also
more than evident in their willingness to associate. Furthermore, it
is evidenced in their acceptance to rescind the management of the
monetary resources of the community (in the case of Los Sellos).
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
On Platforms in the South and New
Organizational Forms
Novel and heterodox governance models emerging in the studied
online communities are one of the multiple outcomes that digital
platforms have had on social interactions in the Global South. As
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developed previously, I argue that the study of these outcomes
and implications in contexts where the level of
institutionalization is low and property rights are not well
defined (i.e., countries in the Global South) has been lacking
in the literature so far. However, having the opportunity to
address this issue and investigate “platformed” communities in
cities of the Global South helps to respond to a growing call for
exploring new avenues of research for “southern” platforms
(Koskinen et al., 2019).
Theorizing the impact of platforms in Colombia and the
evolution of peer governance mechanisms is an issue that
cannot be fully understood without new framing as to the
nuances of both southern practices and the impact of
platforms. Platforms in the Global South are challenging to
study due to the lack of conceptual definitions and their
spread, but most of all due to their intertwined nature with
pre-existing institutions (Koskinen et al., 2019). There is a
phenomenon of shared space between platform technology
and societal structures, such as informality and peer
intermediation, and this has meant platforms in southern
contexts remain largely understudied.
As described by Bhan (2019, p. 5):
“One way to conceptualize a vocabulary of Southern
urban practice, then, is to start from particular empirical
configurations of core urban systems -land,
infrastructure, economy, governance, and cultural
systems-in a particular set of cities’.
The practices of the studied online communities-platforms
are itinerant, informal, and surpass formal structures of
transport no matter the vehicle, while also promoting the
agency of its users. “Platforms” or “Online-communities-
platforms” in this article have therefore that point of
reference in their theorization, framing an ecosystem
developed by means of platforms, and that with technological
mediation, enables the agency of users and creates new
institutions, while de-institutionalizing others.
This analysis of de-institutionalization or institutionalization
is a nuanced way to study how platforms in the Global North
differ from those in the south. The software and transaction
characteristics may be the same, as well as their developmental
nature, but platforms operating in the ‘south’ add an element of
institutional agency by operating in informal settings. Thriving
on a void of informal practices, platforms transform into the
building bricks and cement for the creation of new organizational
forms and institutions that cannot be explained by forcing
conceptualizations applicable to the ‘Global North’.
The most interesting implications of how platforms in the
south differ from the north are in their institutional implications
and their socio-technical nature (Koskinen et al., 2019, p. 325).
Cases like the Mushikashika in Africa (Dumba, 2017) or Go-Jek
in Indonesia (Prananda et al., 2020) are examples of the effect of
platforms in urban institutions. These examples cannot be
understood solely by relying on the technological but must be
engaged with in socio-technical and institutional considerations
of complexities such as informality.
In this article, the study of the “Driver’s Club Bogotá” and “Los
Sellos” online communities showed how, in the process of
creating “platforms”, innovative forms of organization
emerged out of a bricolage of different software and hardware.
In a process that could replicate “co-optation” mechanisms
theorized in the “Möbius Organizational Form” (Watkins and
Stark, 2018), but with its differences for the studied context, as
these online-communities are not firms or formal organizations,
but rather ad-hoc groups with their alternative and particular
“southern” processes.
As I discussed in the two studied cases, it is difficult to classify
the nature of organizational models emerging from these online
communities.
These communities have elements of governance that exist in a
gray space between extractive platform economy, heterodox
sharing economies, and democratic platform cooperativism. In
terms of structures and hierarchies, I observed that managers,
as holders of the “founder” positions at the top and “owners” of
the communities, are deemed to protect the integrity of the
system, and more importantly decide on its rules. Rules that,
even if submitted to democratic decision as was the case of
“Los Sellos”, do not allow members a participation in their
creation.
This clearly does not work in favor of the construction of
democratic structures where interdependence is the main rule of
interaction. It is important to question then whether those
managers or leaders have a power of coercion against
individual actors, which in this case I argue to be possible.
The ability to create rules and the position in which managers
are located as the “creators” of the online community gives them a
leverage, and forces members into an “expected to comply”
behavior.
I also observed a smooth construction of organization models,
based on strong community ties, internal trust, and a sense of
cohesiveness against a context that its hostile. These online
communities-platforms are showing the strength of
community building and designing simple but sophisticated
and efficient models of organization. These models, however,
are not exempt from problematic aspects regarding the lack of
extended democratic models and certain levels of
authoritarianism and corruption that may emerge from a lack
of direct accountability and the management of monetary
resources.
In any case, the characteristics of their internal functioning
and the apparent smoothness and lack of conflict in which
these communities-platforms developed refers to new
questions and subjects that ought to be included in the
theory of governance in online communities. Still left to
discuss are new forms of accountability, in which trust and
community links, together with individual interest of the
members, act as many “eyes” on the processes and
behavior of the managers. We could argue that these
“benevolent dictators” at the top of hierarchies have a
position within their communities out of meritocracy, and
that this is not just upheld but preferred by the members. We
could even state that governance structures, ownership, and
democratic decision-making are more fluid than what is
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expected in the theory, and that maybe we cannot design the
governance models for online communities but learn from
their incrementalism and flexibility.
All the above calls for more research of peer governance in
online communities, especially in the Global South, to evaluate if
the thoughts and conclusions I am proposing here can be
observed in other similar cases. This should be done through
contexts where these types of flexible organizations are giving
solutions that “designed” ones cannot.
What is written and what is real.
The use of theoretical rather than legal or policy terminologies
for platformed “sharing” or “cooperativism” refers here to the
evolving nature of platform economies and organizations.
Coming from an observation on how that what is written,
regulated, or codified as legal does not represent the evolution
of society, especially in contexts of the south.
Latin America is an excessively “legalized” and “politicized” region.
There is an idea in this region that the great social transformations
come from the political arena, with a hidden underestimation of the
role of the individual and their private initiatives in the achievement of
those transformations. I argue here that it is inherent to Latin
American societies and their evolution to believe too much in the
written law and the value of its inception.
Latin Americans tend to believe that the world evolves as it is
described in the written law and regulations, or worse, that it
should be this way. This is enough in this case to put something in
writing for it to be published and fulfilled, thus becoming a
“reality”. This of course is not the case and has never been in the
evolution of societies in this region, nor in the entire Global
South. The idea behind the promulgation of legal definitions and
stringent regulations vs. what ends up happening is represented
in a typical Colombian idiom which perfectly describes the
situation: “Se acata, pero no se cumple” in Spanish, which
means “It is complied with, but not fulfilled”.
Theorizing New Forms of Online Peer
Governance
For the case of the studied online communities, I must insist here in
the argument that the classifications pertinent to organizational forms
and theory of the firm should not be de-contextually applied to what it
is observed in the Global South. Much less if we are to consider the
evolution of platform organization which is relatively new, with its
nuances difficult to define at such an early stage.
Therefore, an observation and development of new
interpretations out of practices is more useful to structure the
hypothesis of a second or ‘southern’ generation of cooperative or
mutualist platforms. This should be a theorization which
responds to the everyday activities and strategies of people and
that can also be harnessed for the implementation of better
policies that do not end up simply as dead words written
on paper.
By using software bricolage of WhatsApp, Zello, and other
platforms, drivers of the online communities unified to defend
themselves against insecurity on the streets and to improve their
work conditions. However, they also united against both a
government that has not been able to cope with the nature of
platforms, and corporate structures such as multinational
platforms that are exploiting them. I argue here then that
recognizing flexible and incrementally structured
organizations, with different forms of accountability built on
trust and individual interest, can be good for an institutional
ecosystem that has proven incapable to provide alternatives of
growth.
Observing how bottom-up processes of governance work
and incorporating their recognition as a valid form of
organization also helps to avoid what has happened
historically in the Global South: Exclusion and informality
with the creation of para-structures of all sorts, which end up
diminishing institutions and development. The recognition of
the nature of organization models and peer governance built
on community links can refer us to a second generation of
platform cooperativism: A platform mutualism which lets
individuals organize using digital technology to grow
themselves, their families, and their societies in countries
that have a right to development.
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